ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
his paper reports on an empirical investigation into the decision-making of investment styles employed by hedge fund managers. The study is based on data recorded over a period of 15 years. The key finding of the study is the demonstration of the difference between decision-making under risk (where probability models such as the frequentist and Bayesian models are used) and decision-making under uncertainty (where fuzzy credibility theory is relevant). Probability models are based on the assumption of normality and precise probability distributions, whereas fuzzy credibility model allows for a higher degree of ambiguity. The study shows that, in a probability framework, the success of a fund manager depends on:

Selectivity skill  Market timing skill (during recovery period),
This finding contradicts the rational expectations model (and the EMH). When the fuzzy credibility (uncertainty) framework is used, this effect disappears. The paper makes a distinction between probability and uncertainty in order to explain the discrepancy between the two predictions in the hedge fund universe.
During the past decades hedge funds have become central to the global financial system, providing loans, liquidity, insurance, and other important services that used to be the exclusive domain of banks (Lo, 2008) . There is a growing concern that the hedge fund industry is not adequately regulated. The empirical results obtained in this paper may contribute in this regard. , represent the return on investment style i used by the fund manager, the risk free rate, the market returns at time t , and the systematic risk of the main style respectively.
The intercept term in Equation (1) is referred to as Jensen alpha and measures the skill of the fund manager. This model is based on the assumption that markets are efficient in the famous Fama (1984) efficient market hypothesis context. In this context all market participants have the same beliefs about asset prices, which presumably suggest no mispricing in the market.
A skilled manager attempts to exploit any mispricing that occurs in the market, thereby generating a certain value of alpha statistically different from zero. Where the value of alpha is positive (negative) it is a signal that the investment style whose rate of returns is it r is underpriced (overpriced) and the fund manager would gain from the style if s/he takes a long (short) position.
The Treynor and Mazuy measure (1966) is a performance measure that separates managerial skill into two: selectivity and market timing skills. A manager with forecasting ability gains more than the market does when the market return is forecast to rise, and loses less than the market does when the market is forecast to fall. Therefore, his portfolio returns will be a concave function of the market returns: This paper employs three robust econometric models to estimate the Jensen alpha, selectivity, and market timing coefficients from Equations 1 and 2 respectively. The first two (frequentist and Bayesian) are referred to as probability models, while the last one (fuzzy credibility theory) is referred to as an uncertainty model. Our aim in using these three different econometric models is to assess whether the estimated coefficients will lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis, which would signify that fund managers do not have enough skills (selectivity and market timing) to outperform the market consistently.
Credibility Theory and Fuzzy Credibility Regression Model
A fuzzy random variable is a function from a measurable space to the set of fuzzy variables. Let  be a non-empty set of events, and 
Cr is a credibility space, and the function
is a fuzzy variable in the credibility theory framework. Fuzzy arithmetic is similar to that of real numbers. The sum (product) of two fuzzy numbers 2 1 and   is also a fuzzy number. The product (sum) of a fuzzy number with a scalar number is also a fuzzy number. We refer interested readers to Liu (2004) for proof.
Membership Function
The membership function represents the degree of possibility that the fuzzy variable  takes some prescribed value. If a fuzzy variable is defined on the triplet   Cr P ), ( ,   then its membership function is derived from the credibility measure by: 
Chance Distribution
A random fuzzy variable is a function from the credibility space   Cr P ), ( ,   to the set of random variables. It is worth noting that two measures are involved in chance distribution, namely the credibility measure
and the probability measure defined in   Pr , , A  where  and A are defined as the fundamental non-empty set events and the event defining the sigma algebra. The combination of credibility and probability measures leads to a hybrid theory referred to as the chance measure theory that models both random and fuzzy events simultaneously. The chance of a random fuzzy event 
The first and second moments of a triangular fuzzy variable are given by:
The mean   The average chance distribution of a random fuzzy variable is a chance distribution involving credibility and probability measure theories. It is used in this paper to model both randomness and fuzziness (ambiguity) in the hedge fund universe. Liu (2007) defines the average chance distribution of a random fuzzy variable  by:
Fuzzy Credibility Regression Model
Credibility regression analysis with average chance distribution describes the relationship of both random variables (such as investment style returns, asset prices, etc.) and fuzzy variables (such as the fund manager's belief about the general market trends, the degree to which a fund manager is bullish, the degree to which a fund manager is bearish on a given investment style, etc.).
The model in Equation (1 or To express the uncertainty about alpha, the ambiguity surrounding the coefficients generating process, the difficulties in verifying the validity of assumptions of the underlying data distribution, the inaccuracy and the distortion introduced by linearization, we present a corresponding fuzzy credibility regression model of the form:  is a vector of triangular fuzzy coefficients estimated under credibility measures. The triangular fuzzy disturbance term is defined in such a way that it contains both randomness and fuzziness; i.e., probability and uncertainty information respectively. Hence it can be written as:
where  is a random disturbance component defined on a probability space
We define a triangular fuzzy set of event  corresponding to the disturbance term: The solution to this optimization problem is obtained using a numerical method proposed by Dennis (1977) and known as the non-linear least square optimization method.
Bayesian Regression Model
The main purpose in applying Bayes's theorem to skill coefficients estimation is to combine the information derived from the investment style returns series with the fund manager's prior belief. We begin by building the posterior distribution from which simulated skill coefficients are generated and averaged to form the posterior outperformance, the posterior selectivity, and the posterior market timing skills. The following equation is used for this purpose:
where  is the set of skill coefficients, and 
TWO-PERIOD PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We test the null hypothesis of no managerial skills (neither selectivity nor market timing skills) in two period framework using three different techniques simultaneously, namely: the contingency table, the chi-square test, and the cross-sectional regression. Following some previous studies (Capocci et al., 2003) , we divide our sample data into four overlapping subsamples that include different economic market trends such as the 1995 financial crisis in Japanese, the 1997 financial crisis in Asian, the Dotcom bubble in 2000, the 1998 Russian financial crisis, and the 2008-2009 sub-prime crisis. It is worth noting that the aim of this paper is not to identify crisis dates that are already known by average informed investors, but instead to assess the effectiveness of each investment style during different economic market trends.
Persistence in performance in this context relates to fund managers who are winners in two consecutive periods (from subsample period 1 to sub-sample period 2 or from sub-sample period 2 to sub-sample period 3 or from sub-sample period 3 to sub-sample period 4) denoted by WW, or losers in two consecutive periods, denoted LL. Similarly, winners in the first period and losers in the second period are denoted by WL, and LW denoted the reverse.
Firstly, the cross product ratio (CPR) proposed by Christensen (1990 ) Secondly, the chi-square test is also used to compare the distribution of observed frequencies for the four categories WW, WL, LW, and LL for each investment style with the expected frequency distribution. Studies carried out in persistence performance using chi-square test (Carpenter & Lynch, 1999; Park & Staum, 1998) reveal that this test based on the numbers of winners and losers is well-specified, powerful, and more robust than other test methodologies, as it deals carefully with the presence of survivorship bias. Lastly, the cross-sectional regression technique is used to investigate the persistence in performance of hedge fund managers. Current period performance parameters (outperformance, selectivity, and market timing skill coefficients) are considered dependent variables, while previous parameters are considered independent variables. If the coefficient of the independent variable is positive and statistically significant then it is an indication that current performance is explained by previous performances; hence there is evidence of persistence in performance; i.e., evidence of managerial skill across two consecutive periods.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Data
We consider a set of returns on hedge fund indices provided by Hedge Fund Research Inc. (HFRI). The monthly returns series are HFRI investment style indices representing the equally weighted returns, net of fees, of hedge funds classified in each investment style. The dataset extends from January 1995 to June 2010. A complete list of all investment styles used in this paper and their respective labels is available from the author. To account for survivorship bias we consider only the sample periods of after 1994. According to Capocci and Hubner (2004) , hedge fund data starting after 1994 is more reliable and does not contain any survivorship bias.
Based on previous work done by Capocci We summarize the results of our investigation on hedge fund performance persistence analysis in the Table  1 . More detailed results corresponding to each econometric model are available from the author. The table reports the persistence in performance per econometric model used in columns, while it reports the technique used to identify persistence in performance for each skill coefficient in rows. For example, the first column of this table can be read as follows. Using the frequentist econometric model, the contingency table results show that there is outperformance skill in hedge funds from sub-sample period 1 to sub-sample 2, and from sub-sample period 2 to sub-sample period 3. This outperformance is due to market timing skill during sub-sample period1 to sub-sample period 2; without selectivity skill during the same sub-sample periods. The results of the first two econometric models (frequentist and Bayesian) show that hedge fund managers exhibit persistence in outperformance skills during the period between sub-sample period 1 and sub-sample period 3. These results contradict the EMH and show that some fund managers have skills to outperform the market during periods of low and strong economic recovery. However, the results obtained with the fuzzy credibility model show that fund managers do not exhibit any presence of outperformance skills during the overall sample period, therefore supporting the EMH according to which no market participant can make risk-adjusted abnormal rates of return.
In addition, the first two econometric models (frequentist and Bayesian) show that fund managers exhibit significant selectivity skill during the period between sub-sample period 3 and sub-sample period 4, while the third model (fuzzy credibility) shows that few hedge fund managers exhibit selectivity skill during period of economic recovery only.
With regard to market timing skills, the first two econometric models show that there is presence of persistence in market timing skill "for some managers" during the period between sub-sample period 1 and subsample period 2 only. The third econometric model shows that fund managers exhibit persistence in market timing skill during the period between sub-sample period 3 and sub-sample period 4. Many market experts believe that the period after the sub-prime crisis would see asset prices coming off their lows, making it easy for many fund managers to time the market precisely when it is coming out of the recession.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
The main objective of this paper is to determine whether fund managers can outperform the market consistently during different economic market trends. To reach this objective, monthly returns on hedge fund indices collected from the HFRI group (one of the largest hedge fund data providers in the world) are considered for the period between January 1995 and June 2010. With this main objective in mind, we divide our entire sample into four overlapping sub-sample periods in order to determine whether skilled fund managers would consistently outperform the market in these different sub-sample periods. Our sample sub-division is consistent with what has been done previously in the literature (see for example Capocci et al., 2003; Carhart, 1997) . We base our inferences on the EMH as a prediction model by assuming that the market is efficient and that fund managers cannot outperform it. To carry out this performance analysis, we use the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964) and quadratic CAPM (Treynor & Mazuy, 1966) and employ three different econometric models, namely the frequentist, the Bayesian, and the fuzzy credibility models to estimate the outperformance, the selectivity and the market timing skill coefficients. The first two models are referred to as probability models, while the last one is termed an uncertainty model. Using three different techniques widely applied in hedge fund performance analysis (see for example Naik, 2009) -contingency table, chi-square test, and cross-sectional regression -we obtain the following results.
The performance analysis results obtained with the first econometric model (Frequentist) show that fund managers have skills to outperform the market during the entire sample period. However, this outperformance is mostly due to market timing skill rather than selectivity skill. In order to test the robustness of our findings, we replicated the same analysis using the second and third econometric models; i.e., the Bayesian and fuzzy regression models.
For the Bayesian regression model, we employed the Monte Carlo simulation method using the Gibbs sampler with 21,000 simulations. Results obtained with this econometric model show that fund managers have the skills to outperform the market during sub-sample period 1 through sub-sample period 3. This market outperformance is due to market timing skill during sub-sample period 1 and sub-sample period 2 and to selectivity skill during sub-sample period 2 through sub-sample period 3.
The last econometric model (fuzzy regression) results in findings that are opposite to those obtained with the two previous probability models. These results show that although there are some managers with little selectivity skill (during sub-sample 3 to sub-sample period 4) and timing skill (during recovery period only), fund managers do not have enough skills to outperform the market because of lack of market timing.
One major economic explanation of the difference between probability and uncertainty models is that, theoretically speaking, the source of hedge fund performance is market inefficiencies which are exploited by skilled fund managers to generate alphas. The recent increase in the number of sophisticated computer programs such as high frequency trading, which detect market mispricings and exploit them spontaneously, has made market inefficiencies even rarer, thereby leading to greater market efficiency. Given the pressure from their investors, some fund managers attempt to conduct illicit activities such as insider trading in order to create alphas.
The scarcity of market inefficiency is an indication that the results obtained with our uncertainty model are reliable. Uncertainty models use quantity information (return series) as well as fuzziness (scarcity of market inefficiency, level of bullishness or bearishness, etc.) to show that the risk-adjusted investment returns of hedge funds may be equal to those of the market (especially in bear markets) due to the high management and performance fees that hedge funds charge to their investors. In these circumstances, EMH partisans would argue that due to information dissemination, there is no arbitrage opportunity in hedge funds.
In contrast, probability models show that the presence of some fund managers endowed with selectivity and market timing skills is proof that bounded rationality leads to market inefficiency. This finding contributes to ongoing research in the field of behavioural finance which believes that market inefficiencies are the result of less than fully rational behaviour on the part of some market participants.
Although some fund managers can beat the market, investors in hedge funds need to understand that their money is held for a long lock-in period and that the administration and management fees they pay to hedge funds can lower their profit and make their risk-adjusted return equal to that of the market.
The uncommon risk-taking behaviour we have witnessed recently in the hedge fund industry is a result of the fact that the compensation of fund managers is determined by their performance. If the performance is better, the manager is likely to get large bonus. Consequently each fund manager attempts to take higher risk in order to obtain better performance. When fund managers take risky positions, they know that they expose their firm to significant risk, but they do not care about it because their compensation scheme does not force them to face the consequences of the risk they take.
